Satellites now form a core component for space based systems such as GPS and GLONASS which provide location and timing information for a variety of uses. Such satellites are designed for operating on orbit to perform tasks and have lifetimes of 10 years or more. Reliability, availability and maintainability (RAM) analysis of systems has been indispensable in the design phase of satellites in order to achieve minimum failures or to increase mean time between failures (MTBF) and thus to plan maintenance strategies, optimise reliability and maximise availability. In this paper, we present formal modelling of both a single satellite and a satellite navigation system and logical specification of their reliability, availability and maintainability properties respectively. The probabilistic model checker PRISM has been used to perform automated analysis of these quantitative properties.
Introduction
With the emergence of efficient, high-performance, and low cost satellites, earth orbiting satellites are often deployed in satellite constellations and space systems to ensure reliable and dependable missions. These kinds of satellites have played an essential part in both civil and military contexts, and support a wide range of applications ranging from satellite navigation to space stations. Most of these applications are safety-related and heavily depend on safety-critical infrastructures within the systems. A group of artificial satellites which work in concert is known as a satellite constellation. Satellite constellation is a number of satellites with coordinated ground coverage, operating together under shared control, synchronised so that they overlap in coverage and complement rather than interfere with other satellites coverage [1] .
A satellite navigation system is a satellite constellation consisting of a number of navigation satellites that provide autonomous geospatial positioning with global or regional coverage. It is by far one of the most successful applications of satellites, and has been developed since 1973. A satellite navigation system with global coverage is referred to as a global navigation satellite system (GNSS). Leading international projects include the United States' Global Position System (GPS) and the Russia's Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), both of which are fully operational GNSSs. Besides, China is expanding its regional Beidou navigation system into the global compass navigation system, and the European Union's Galileo positioning system is a GNSS in the initial deployment phase. Both of these systems are planned to be fully operational in the next decade. Other countries such as India, France, and Japan are in the process of developing their own regional navigation systems. The paper [2] is a good overview of these satellite navigation systems.
A satellite is designed to a functional requirement and it is important that it satisfies this requirement. However it is also desirable that the satellite should be predictably available and this depends upon the its reliability and availability. We aim to help the military or civil end users of the satellite to assess the likelihood and consequences of fault or failure to their operations. Reliability, availability and maintainability (RAM) analysis has been indispensable in the design phase of satellite navigation systems in order to achieve minimum failures or to increase mean time between failures (MTBF) and thus to plan maintenance strategies, optimise reliability and maximise availability. The question of how to select optimal configurations and maintenance plans and underlying resources, to satisfy requirements and improve efficiency is a key research question. This concern calls for effective solutions to the challenges of verifying large and complex navigation systems.
Until now, attempts to verifying satellite based systems has been piece-meal. Verification largely depends on more brute force approaches, such as simulation and testing. Simulation is the common testing and validation approach used for the verification of satellite systems. Given a system, a finite subset of the possible scenarios are selected in a specific simulation environment, and then statistical analysis techniques are applied to obtain probabilistic results for that system. However, simulation has been unable to keep up with the growth in design complexity of satellite systems. On the other hand, formal verification is a well-established technique in Computer Science for either detecting errors, or for providing increased confidence in the reliability of a system. It is therefore timely to apply formal verification techniques to this domain. Formal verification can be applied to formally verify satellite systems using automated tools including model checkers or theorem provers. Model checking is a formal verification technique that involves defining a model of a system from a formal specification. The model is then used to check desired properties of the system. This involves exploring the underlying state space of the model, and specifying properties via some formal logic such as temporal logic. In this context, the effects of proposed changes to an on orbit system can be first checked via a model, rather than via expensive prototypes. The required reliability, availability, and maintainability properties of satellite systems can be expressed in temporal logic, and so lend themselves very well to proof via model checking.
The goal of the paper is to adopt probabilistic model checking to cope with the verification demand introduced by satellite systems. Probabilistic model checking is a formal method for specifying quantitative properties of a system model. Models obtained by this technique are normally extensions or variants of Markov chains or automata, extended with costs and rewards that estimate resources and their usage during operation. Properties to be verified or analysed are specified in temporal logic with auxiliary operators such as probability and reward. We present an automated quantitative analysis of reliability, availability, and maintainability of both a single satellite system and a satellite navigation system, using the probabilistic model checker PRISM [3] .
Our paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the underlying satellite navigation systems. In Section 3 the use of formal methods is introduced, while in Section 4 we give technical background on probabilistic model checking. In Section 5 we present our formal specifications of a single satellite and constellation systems and their associated continuous-time Markov chain models respectively. Then, we analyse reliability, availability, and maintainability using the probabilistic model checker PRISM for a single satellite and a satellite constellation in Sections 6. In Section 7 we report related work for verifying satellite systems using model checking. Finally, in Section 8 we conclude and outline directions for future research.
Satellite navigation systems
As a important application of satellite constellation, satellite navigation systems consist of three major segments: a space segment, a control segment, and a user segment. The space segment is made up of a number of satellites, and is responsible for sending the navigation signal on the specific frequency. It is constantly orbiting the surface at an altitude of approximate three earth radii, and emitting signals that travel at approximately the speed of light. The control segment monitors the health and status of the space segment and controls the state of satellites, and updates the data of those satellites. The user segment consists of antennas and receiver processors, which receive the signals broadcasted by the satellites and decode them to provide precise information about the receivers position and velocity. In this paper, we use the space segment the same as the paper [4] .
In a satellite constellation, fault or failure of more than one satellites will have a direct impact on the stable state of the space geometry and temporal relationship, and the performance of the constellation. So the performance of the constellation is a direct consequence of the state of the constellation. Therefore, the state of the constellation has a closely relationship with the state of every satellite in the constellation. So each satellite is critical to the constellation.
In this paper, our task is to help the end users of satellite and space based systems to evaluate the probability and consequences of faults or failures. The terms of fault and failure in our context can be defined according to [5] as follows,
• Fault: the condition of a satellite that occurs when one of its components or assemblies degrades or exhibits abnormal behaviour;
• Failure: the termination of the ability of a satellite to perform a required function.
Failure is an event as distinguished from fault, which is a state. According to [5] , the failure mode is the result by which a failure is observed. After a failure, a satellite in the constellation will be systematically examined in order to identify the failure mode, and to determine the nature of the failure and its basic cause. There are three kinds of failure mode of the satellite: longterm failure (unrecoverable failure), short-term failure, and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) failure. These failure modes are described as follows,
• Long-term failure: this failure is vital to the satellite. If a long-time failure has happened, it usually needs to launch another satellite to replace the failed one. Practically, it indicates that the failed satellite is at the end of its life. It also has been called wear out failure;
• Short-term failure: this refers to the failure that can be repaired in several hours or days. This kind of failure mode means that there is usually no need to launch a new satellite to replace the failed satellite;
• O&M failure: it is the planned maintenance operations, such as navigation satellite orbit manoeuvre and atomic clock switching. We usually do not consider the outage time that is induced by these operations as a failure. It is not expected to impact the continuity of the constellation, but the performance of the constellation.
Whenever a satellite has a fault or fails, there is a chance to repair the satellite on orbit by, for example, rebooting the satellite system, updating the satellite software, or switching the orbit of the satellite. There are three satellite backup modes available for maintenance strategies: on orbit backup, parking orbit backup, and Launch on Need (LON). The on orbit backup mode and parking orbit backup mode are further referred to as space backup. In this paper, we consider both space backup and LON backup. The main satellite navigation system to be modelled and analysed is depicted in Figure 1 .
Satellites deployed at the parking orbit backup mode can also be used to work with on orbit satellites. For LON backup mode, it usually needs several months to replace failed satellite, while for space backup mode it only needs one or two days. Because of the lower Mean time between repair (MTTR) for the space backup mode, it has been widely applied in most constellation projects. In the GPS project, the redundant satellites are working with on orbit satellites, so as to replace failed satellites in a short time.
Analysis techniques
In this paper, our models are Continuous-time Markov Chains (CTMCs), and we verify our models using model checking. Before formally introducing this technique and discussing the role of formal verification, we briefly review some traditional software and hardware verification and analysis techniques that can be applied to analysing satellite and space based systems, which led by testing and simulation.
Testing is a dynamic verification technique that involves actually running software systems. Testing takes the system under analysis and uses inputs as tests. Correctness is thus verified by running the system to traverse a set of execution paths. Based on the results during test execution, the actual output of the system is compared to the system specification which is usually in the form of documents.
Simulation is similar to testing, but is applied to system models which represent the underlying system for analysis. Models are usually described using hardware description languages. A simulator is used to examine execution paths of the system model based on configuration inputs. These inputs can be provided by a user, or by automated approaches such as using a random generator. A mismatch between the simulator's result and the specification of the system exhibits the incorrect behaviours.
Both verification techniques are limited in that they only allow exploration of a small subset of many possible scenarios. Formal methods is the application of mathematical modelling and reasoning to prove that an implementation coincides with precisely expressed notion of formal specification. In this context, the purpose of formal analysis and verification is to analyse the performance and to verify the correctness and properties of satellite and space based systems in such way that faults and failures can be identified. Model checking and theorem proving are formal techniques that can be used to detect faults and failures in a formal specification.
Although historically these forms of verification were used to prove correctness of explicit software and hardware designs, these days they are also used for failure analysis. They are generally applied during the design phase, where they are arguably most effective, for verifying correctness and other essential properties. Model checking is an automated analysis technique in spite of that it requires expert knowledge to use. The user must provide an initial specification of the system itself, as well as logical properties describing its desired behaviour.
One strength of model checking to traditional analysis techniques is that it is not sensitive to the probability that a fault or failure is exposed; this contrasts with testing and simulation that are aimed at tracing the most probable faults or failures. Moreover, it is able to precisely get the analysis results of desired properties. Model checking is a general analysis technique that is applicable to a wide range of applications such as embedded systems, software engineering, and hardware design. It also supports analysing properties individually, thus allowing focus essential properties first. This strength enable incomplete formal models to be specified and verified.
The formal model of systems can be defined using a high-level formalism or extracted directly form software using methods such as abstract interpretation. The verification proceeds through exhaustive exploration of the state transition graph of the model. Quantitative verification is a analysis technique for establishing quantitative properties of a system model. Models analysed through this method are typically variants of Markov chains, annotated with costs and rewards that describe resources and their usage during execution. Properties are expressed in temporal logic extended with probabilistic and reward operators. Quantitative verification involves a combination of a traversal of the state transition system of the model and numerical computation. In this paper, we employ the power of probabilistic model checking approach, which is a leading quantitative verification and analysis technique for a wide variety of systems.
Probabilistic model checking
In this section we introduce some formal notations that are relevant to probabilistic model checking. Note that our definitions in Section 4.1 and 4.2 are from [6] , from which further details can be found.
Continuous-time Markov chains
Definition 1. Let AP be a fixed, finite set of atomic propositions. Formally, a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) C is a tuple (S,s init ,R,L) where:
• S = {s 1 , s 2 , ..., s n } is a finite set of states.
• s init ∈ S is the initial state.
• R : S × S → R ≥0 is the transition rate matrix.
• L : S → 2 AP is a labelling function which assigns to each state s i ∈ S the set L(s i ) of atomic propositions a ∈ AP that are valid in s i .
Intuitively, R(s i , s j ) > 0 if and only if there is a transition from state s i to state s j . Furthermore, R(s i , s j ) specifies that the probability of moving from s i to s j within t time units is 1 − e −R(s i ,s j )·t , an exponential distribution with rate R(s i , s j ). If R(s i , s j ) > 0 for more than one state s j , a competition between the transitions originating in s i exists, known as the race condition.
The probability to move from a non-absorbing state s i to a particular state s j within t time units, i.e., the transition s i → s j wins the race, is given by:
where E(s i ) = s j ∈S R(s i , s j ) denotes the total rate at which any transition outgoing from state s i is taken. More precisely, E(s i ) specifies that the probability of taking a transition outgoing from the state s i within t time units is 1 − e −E(S i )·t , since the minimum of two exponentially distributed random variables is an exponentially distributed random variable with rate the sum of their rates. Consequently, the probability of moving from a nonabsorbing state s i to s j by a single transition, denoted P (s i , s j ), is determined by the probability that the delay of going from s i to s j finishes before the delays of other outgoing edges from s i ; formally, P (s i , s j ) = R(s i , s j )/E(s). For an absorbing state s i , the total rate is E(s i ). In that case, we have P (s i , s j ) = 0 for any state s j .
Continuous stochastic logic
In this paper, we use Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL) [7, 8] as a temporal logic for specifying reliability, availability, and maintainability properties for our analysis. CSL is inspired by the logic Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [9] , and its extensions to discrete time stochastic systems (PCTL) [10] , and continuous time non-stochastic systems (TCTL) [11] . There are two types of formulae in CSL: state formulae, which are true or false in a specific state, and path formulae, which are true or false along a specific path.
Definition 2. Let a ∈ AP be an atomic proposition, p ∈ [0, 1] be a real number, ∈ {≤, <, >, ≥} be a comparison operator, and I ⊆ R ≥0 be a non-empty interval. The syntax of CSL formulas over the set of atomic propositions AP is defined inductively as follows:
• true is a state-formula.
• Each a ∈ AP is a state formula.
• If Φ and Ψ are state formulas, then so are ¬Φ and Φ ∧ Ψ.
• If Φ is state formula, then so is S p (Φ).
• If ϕ is a path formula, then P p (ϕ).
• If Φ and Ψ are state formulas, then X I Φ and U I Ψ are path formulas.
Formula S p (Φ) asserts that the steady-state probability for a state satisfying Φ meets the bound p. Similarly, formula P p (ϕ) asserts that the probability measure of the paths satisfying ϕ meets the bound given by p. The operator P p (.) replaces the usual CTL path quantifiers ∃ and ∀. Intuitively, ∃ϕ represents that there exists a path for which ϕ holds and corresponds to P >0 (ϕ), and ∀ϕ represents that for all paths ϕ holds and corresponds to P >1 (ϕ). The temporal operator X I is the timed variant of the standard next operator in CTL; the path formula X I Φ asserts that a transition is made to a Φ state at some time point t ∈ I. Operator U I is the timed variant of the until operator of CTL; the path formula ΦU I Ψ asserts that Ψ is satisfied at some time instant in the interval I and that at all preceding time instants Φ holds.
In this paper, we use PRISM probabilistic model checker [3] . It supports the analysis of several types of probabilistic models: discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs), continuous-time Markov chains (CTMCs), Markov decision processes (MDPs), probabilistic automata (PAs), and also probabilistic timed automata (PTAs), with optional extensions of costs and rewards. Moreover, PRISM allows us to verify properties specified in the temporal logics PCTL for DTMCs and MDPs and CSL for CTMCs. Models are described using the PRISM language, a simple, state-based language.
Reactive modules of PRISM
Markov models to be specified in PRISM are based on a simple, statebased language which is based on the Reactive Modules formalism [12] . The fundamental components of this language are modules and variables. A system is constructed as the parallel composition of a set of modules. A module contains a number of variables which express the state of the module. Its behaviour is given by a set of guarded commands of the form:
All background in this subsection is based on the PRISM Manual version 4.1. The guard is a predicate over all the variables of the system and the command describes a transition which the module can make if the guard is true. A command is specified by defining the new values of the variables of that module. A module can read all of the variables in the system but only write to its own local variables. In general, the behaviour of a module is probabilistic, in which case a command takes the form:
where < prob > is a probability when the model is a DTMC or MDP and a non-negative, real value, which is taken to be the parameter of an exponential distribution, when it is a CTMC. In addition, the pair of square brackets at the start of a guarded command can contain a label. Actions from different modules with the same label take place synchronously.
Formal modelling of satellite systems
In this section, we give an description of the basic formal models of both a single satellite and a satellite navigation system.
A formal model of a single satellite
The abstract model of a single satellite is illustrated in Figure 2 , parameters are omitted. We take a CTMC as our underlying PRISM model for our abstract model.
We specify our CTMC model with states, a transition rate matrix, and a labelling function. Initially, the satellite runs in the normal state. After a period of execution it could be interrupted by an planned or unplanned interruption. Planned interruptions are normally caused by certain types of Operations and Maintenance (O&M), which could include manoeuvring the station, atomic clock maintenance, software updates, and hardware maintenance. Unplanned interruptions can be caused by solar radiation, the earth's magnetic field cosmic rays, which result in a satellite Single Event Upset (SEU). However, both planned and unplanned interruptions are usually temporary, lasting just several hours. An unplanned interruption usually disappears automatically. The satellite can fail any time during its lifetime due to End-of-Life (EOL) outage or other vital failures.
When the satellite fails, staff on the ground must decide upon the best approach to repair it. It may be possible that failures can be resolved on orbit by giving specific software commands to the satellite. Otherwise it might be necessary to move a redundant satellite into position to replace the failed satellite. If no redundant satellite is available then a new satellite must be manufactured and launched. In the worst case, the new satellite does not launch successfully, due to a known probability of satellite launch failure.
In our paper, parameter values correspond to those of the latest United States' GPS system, GPS Block III satellites. The GPS III series is the newest block of GPS satellites (SVN-74 and up). GPS III provides more powerful signals than previous versions in addition to enhanced signal reliability, accuracy, and integrity. The key improvement is the 15 years' design lifespan [13] . Since not all of the actual data for the GPS III is available, in this paper we instead use some parameter values associated with similar satellite systems. All parameters used in our CTMC model and properties are specified in Table 1 .
Our PRISM specification are given in Figures 3 and 4 , and is described as the following. We use p to express probability and t for time, and the reliability of the satellite is R. If the satellite fails, we say that it moves from a "normal" state to a "failure" state. Both the mean time to unplanned interruption and the mean time to the planned interruption are t α . When the satellite fails, the probability of the failure being resolved in-orbit by moving a redundant satellite to replace the failed one is p β . If on orbit repair is not possible, a new satellite is needed. The times taken to decide to build a new satellite and for one to be manufactured are t γ and t δ respectively. If a new satellite is to be manufactured, the probability of successful launch is p η . After successful launch, the time taken for the satellite to move to the right position and a normal signal sent from it to be received on the ground is t κ .
A formal model of a satellite constellation
We have modelled a single satellite as a CTMC, by specifying it in PRISM. However, the RAM analysis of a single satellite appears insufficient for larger satellite navigation systems. For a large global navigation system, at least 24 satellites are required. Even for a regional navigation system, at least 4 satellites are required. Our PRISM model for a satellite constellation is thus constructed using that for a single satellite, with a number of modifications as follows,
• the number of satellites is declared as a global variable, and multiple satellites modules must be instantiated;
• the configuration of the satellite constellation must be defined;
• redundant satellites that are usually called spare satellites must be included.
Note that the last modification above is due to the fact that, in a real system, if an on orbit satellite fails, redundant on orbit satellites are used to move and replace them, to ensure the availability of the constellation.
The reference model of the satellite constellation is depicted in Figure 5 . The constellation has n satellites on orbit, and m spare satellites. If the on orbit satellites do not fail, the state of the constellation keeps n satellites available. Once an on orbit satellite fails, one of the spare satellites will replace it immediately to keep n in working condition. If any on orbit satellite fails and there is no spare satellite available to replace it, the number of satellites in the constellation will be reduced to a number smaller than n. Thus, spare satellites play a crucial effect on the availability of the satellite constellation.
In the reference model, if the number of satellites in the constellation is n, and the number of spare satellites is m, the launch on schedule (LOS) strategy is to not launch a new satellite. At any time at most one satellite can be repaired. If any on orbit satellite fails, it is immediately replaced by a spare satellite, and repair of the failed satellite commences. If there are no spare satellites, the constellation must operate with fewer than n satellites.
Since the focus of our research is to apply the probabilistic model checking approach and to study its applicability to a satellite constellation, the object of our paper is not limited to any specific satellite navigation system. The system we study here follows a standard configuration for global navigation system. Due to the fact that the current United States' GPS is the most widely used navigation system, so parameter values of the constellation also refer to the latest basic parameter settings of such constellation. The parameter values are shown in Table 2 .
Our PRISM specification is given in Figure 6 , 7, and 8. Assume that the failure and repair rates of a satellite are λ and µ respectively. When the constellation is operating with n usable satellites, the state transfer rate of the constellation is nλ. When there are no spare satellites and satellites begin to fail , the transfer rate reduces accordingly to nλ, where λ is the number of functioning satellites. The repair rate of each state of the constellation is µ.
Specification of properties and automated analysis

Desired quantitative properties
We have identified the need to analyse reliability, availability, and maintainability properties of satellite navigation systems. In the GPS standard proposed by the [14] , there are two definitions of availability. The first one is the probability that the slots in the constellation will be occupied by a satellite transmitting a trackable and healthy Standard Positioning Service (SPS) Signal in Space (SIS). The second definition is the percentage of time that the SPS SIS is available to a SPS receiver. According to the same standard, there are two kinds of availability of satellites. The first is the per-slot availability, and the second is the constellation availability, which can be described as follows,
• Per-slot availability: The time that a slot in the constellation will be occupied by a satellite that is transmitting a trackable and healthy SPS SIS;
• Constellation availability: the time that a specified number of slots in the constellation are occupied by satellites that are transmitting a trackable and healthy SPS SIS.
In our research, we do not consider the environment effect of the signal for the availability analysis. We only consider fault or failure of satellites. In our context, availability means the ratio of running time for normal satellites to total running time for both normal and failed satellites. In our paper, the availabilities that we have analysed are: single satellite availability and satellite constellation availability.
The reliability for a satellite consists of planned interruptions, unplanned interruptions, and failure states in the system. The probability of successful launch is the reliability of the satellite. "Actually, the probability that a satellite to be repaired on orbit" is the maintainability of the satellite. Generally, both reliability and maintainability can be considered as availability properties of the satellite. Reliability must be sufficient to support the mission capability needed in its expected operating environment.
If reliability and maintainability are not adequately designed into satellite and space based systems, there is risk that the design will breach desired availability or performance requirements. System performance baseline thresholds with significantly higher design or development costs due to resulting corrective action costs. This will cost more than anticipated to use and operate, or will fail to provide availability expected by the researchers or users.
Satellites will deteriorate with time due to failure mechanisms. We assume that time delay is a random variable selected from an exponential distribution, which is an assumption used in PRISM. According to the system reliability theory [15] , the reliability of a satellite R(t) can be defined as:
and, then we can obtain:
Satellite failures typically occur at some constant failure rate λ, and failure probability depends on the rate λ and the exposure time t. According to [5] , typically failure rates are carefully derived from substantiated historical data such as mean time between failure (M T BF ). We have:
where t = T = M T BF , and M T BF is the design parameter or the statistics parameter. Referring to the latest characteristics of satellites used for Global Positioning Systems (GPSs), we assume the M T BF of the satellite to be 15 years. As a result, R = 0.80 and M T BF = 15 years. Further, the mean time to repair (M T T R) is 24 hours. For the evaluation of the availability of the constellation, we focus on longterm failure effects the constellation. The long term reflect the lifetime of the satellite, and can be described by the MTBF and MTTTR. The MTBF is used to get the parameter failure rate λ according to the Equation 4. MTTR is used to get the parameter repair rate µ according to the Equation 5 .
PRISM provides support for automated analysis of a wide range of quantitative properties of these models, such as "what is the probability of a failure causing the satellite to stop working within 12 hours?", "what is the worst-case probability of the satellite on-board system terminating due to an error, over all possible initial configurations?", or "what is the worst-case expected time taken for the satellite signal to be received?".
Automated analysis of a single satellite 6.2.1. Reliability properties and analysis results
Reliability properties of a single satellite that we can analyse using PRISM include:
1. when R = 0.80, the probability that a satellite will need to be replaced by a new one in 15 years:
[F <= T s = 5]; T = 129600 2. when R = 0.80, the probability that a satellite will need to be replaced The analysis results of reliability properties which we obtain from PRISM are shown in Table 3 . As is shown in Figure 9 (a), the probability that the satellite has a failure and is unable to be repaired during 15 years is 7.71%. From the analysis result in Figure 9 (b) , the number of times the satellite will have a failure and be unable to be repaired in 15 years is 0.08, under the precondition that the reliability is 0.80. If the reliability is set to 0.5, the number of vital failures will be smaller than 0.25 during 15 years. Using the property to calculate the number of unplanned interruptions, the number of times will be 29.95 in 15 years.
Maintainability properties and analysis results
Maintainability properties of a single satellite that we can analyse using PRISM include:
1. when R = 0.80, the number of times that satellites need to be repaired on orbit in 15 years: The reward expression is the same as that for maintainability property 1. 4. when R = 0.80, the number of cases that a satellite needs to be repaired on orbit, but not eventually succeed in 15 years:
The reward expression is the same as that for maintainability property 1.
The analysis results of maintainability properties which we obtain from PRISM are shown in Table 4 . The number of times the satellite needs to be repaired on orbit over time is shown in Figure 10(a) . When the reliability of the satellite is increased to 0.5, the number of times the satellite needs to be repaired will decrease to 0.5. Figure 10 (b) illustrates that the number of times that the satellite needs to be repaired is below 1 when the M T BF is 2 years.
Availability properties and analysis results
Availability properties of a single satellite that we can analyse using PRISM includes: The analysis results of availability properties which we obtain from PRISM are shown in Table 5 . As is shown in Figure 11 (a) , if the reliability increases to 0.4, the availability of the satellite reaches 0.995. So if the required probability of the available satellite is 0.995, the reliability must have minimum value 0.4. Figure 11 (b) presents the result of availability property 3). It shows that if the required availability is 0.995, the time taken for planned interruption for the satellite will be smaller than 16 hours.
Automated analysis of a satellite constellation 6.3.1. Reliability properties and analysis results
Reliability properties of a satellite constellation that we can analyse using PRISM include:
1. when the reliability is 0.80, the probability of the case that the number of the useable satellites in the constellation is smaller than 24 in 15 years: P =?[F <= T (s = 4)]; T = 129600 2. when the reliability is 0.80, the probability of the case that the number of the useable satellites in the constellation is smaller than 22 in 15 years:
3. the number of times that all redundant satellites have the chance to fail in 15 years over the reliability and time:
The reward expression in PRISM model is the following: rewards num f ail [a2] true : 1; endrewards
The analysis results of reliability properties which we obtain from PRISM are shown in Table 6 . From the Figure 12(a) , when the reliability is between 0 and 0.25, the number of times that all redundant satellite need to be repaired is proportional to the reliability. Along with the increase of the reliability, the number of times increases and reaches to its maximum value of 4.76. But when the reliability is between 0.25 and 1, the number of times that all redundant satellite need to be repaired is inversely proportional to reliability. This is due to the fact that when the reliability decreases to a specific value and become worse after that, redundant satellites cannot be repaired any more. According to Figure 12 (b) , the number of times to repair that all redundant satellite need to be repaired is between 0 and 0.095 in 15 years.
Maintainability properties and analysis results
Maintainability properties of a satellite constellation that we can analyse using PRISM include:
1. the average number of times to repair all satellites in the constellation in 15 years:
The reward expression in PRISM model is shown as Figure 13 . 2. The number of times to repair all satellites in the constellation over the reliability in 15 years:
The reward expression in PRISM model is shown as Figure 13 . 3. The probability of the case that the number of useable satellites in the constellation is smaller than 22 in 15 years over the number of times for repairing satellites: P =?[F <= T (s = 6)]; T = 129600; x = 0.1 : 3600 : 72
The analysis results of maintainability properties which we obtain from PRISM are shown in Table 7 . From Figure 14 (a) , Along with the increase of the reliability, the number of times that all satellites in the constellation need to be repaired over the reliability in 15 years decreases from 35 to 2.5 when the reliability reaches 90%. As depicted in Figure 14 (b) , the probability of the case that the constellation consists of n satellites with n is smaller than 22 in 15 years is 0.0225%.
Availability properties and analysis results
Availability properties of a satellite constellation that we can analyse using PRISM include: The analysis results of availability properties which we obtain from PRISM are shown in Table 8 . The availability of the satellite constellation over the reliability and the time taken to repair satellites are shown in Figure 15 (a) and 15(b) respectively. According to Figure 15 (a) , if the availability of the constellation is 99.99% and the time taken to repair a satellite is 5 months, the reliability is at least 86.00%. When the reliability is 80.00% For the same availability requirement of the constellation, when the satellite has a fault or fails, the time taken to repair a satellite is at most 2520 hours (3.5 months).
Discussion
Since parameter settings of our formal models are based on GPS Block III which is newest generation of GPS systems, our analysis results can be compared to existing GPS statistical analysis. According to the report [16] of Lockheed Martin, a leading global security and aerospace company, the availability of the GPS Block III is given as 99.9%. The availability we evaluate in this paper is close to the actual data. According to the report of [17] from Lockheed Martin, the constellation availability of the GPS Block III is given as 99.88%. In this paper, the availability we evaluate for two scenarios is both close to the actual data. This indicates that our approach to a singe satellite and satellite constellation is feasible and efficient. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use probabilistic model checking techniques to perform RAM analysis of satellite systems.
Through the analysis, we have demonstrated the applicability of quantitative analysis of desired properties based on temporal logic, returning quantities computed by model checking rather than a true or false answer. The benefit of applying exhaustive probabilistic model checking to quantitative analysis of satellite systems is that the results can be plotted as graphs that can be inspected for trends and anomalies. Furthermore, we are able to compute exact quantities, rather than approximations based on a large number of simulations, thus enabling to obtain complete and exhaustive conclusions for all possible parameter values. In addition, our approach enables automated analysis. This helps manual analysis with automatic analysis support, thus making development more efficient and minimising human errors during the design phase.
Related work
There is an urgent need for effective verification of large and complex satellite and space based systems. The design and verification of satellite systems have been in the research fields of both computer science and system engineering. There are multiple dimensions that need to be considered and treated such as safety, reliability, availability, maintainability, and survivability. So far, verification attempts to satellite and spacecraft systems have been very piecemeal approaches. For example, [18] used Markov models to evaluate the cost of availability of coverage of satellite constellation. [19] used simulation to assess the GPS risk, while [20] used model checking to simulate satellite operational procedures.
There have been a number of notable attempts to use formal methods to address the problems of design exploration for a satellite system. The theorem prover PVS [21] was used to verify desired properties in system models of Ariane 5 where cost of failure is highest. The PICGAL project [22] has analysed ground-based software for launch vehicles similar to Ariane 5. In the NASA report [23] , formal methods and their approaches to critical systems are explained to stakeholders from the aerospace domain. In the survey [24] , the potential role of formal methods in the analysis of software failures in space missions is discussed. Similarly, [25] explores how verification techniques, such as static analysis, model checking, and compositional verification, can be used to gain trust in model-based systems.
Model checking has been successfully applied to numerous computer systems and their applications, including both software and hardware systems [26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31] . Historically, model checking has been considered to be a powerful extension of the traditional verification process such as emulation and simulation. It has also proved to be a suitable formal technique for exposing errors in satellites, mainly due to classical concurrency errors. Unforeseen interleavings between processes many cause undesired events to happen. In the paper [32] , the SPIN model checker [33] was used to formally analyse a multithreaded plan execution module. This module is a component of NASA's artificial intelligence-based spacecraft control system which launched in 1998 as part of the Deep Space 1 mission. Five previously undiscovered errors were identified in the spacecraft controller, in one case representing a major design flaw.
The model checking tool Murψ [34] has been used in [35] to model the Entry, Descent and Landing phase of the Mars Polar Lander. The model checker was used to search for sequences of states that led to the violation of a Murψ invariant. This stated that the thrust of the pulse-width modulation, which controls the thrust of the descent engines, should always be above a certain altitude. In [36] the model checker NuSMV [37] is used to model and verify the implementation of a mission and safety critical embedded satellite software control system. The control system is responsible for maintaining the attitude of the satellite and for performing fault detection, isolation, and recovery decisions, at a detailed level.
A preliminary research of the work in this paper is presented in the pa-per [38] . This paper extends the exposition captured therein and includes additional multiple satellite systems. In this paper, we focus on probabilistic model checking technique to this novel domain, where in our preliminary work we concentrated on the formal verification itself, for the benefit of the formal methods community. Similar to ours, [39] have used formal techniques on a regular design of a modern satellite, except they used the COMPASS automated tool to carry out their analysis. COMPASS [40] supports model checking techniques for verifying correctness, using fault trees for safety analysis. The major difference between their work and ours is that we perform formal analysis of quantitative properties such as reliability, availability, and maintainability of both a single satellite and a satellite constellation. They mainly verify qualitative properties of a single satellite such as correctness, safety, and dependability.
Conclusions and future work
Reliability, availability and maintainability (RAM) analysis of systems has been indispensable in the design phase of satellites in order to achieve minimum failures or to increase mean time between failures (MTBF) and thus to plan maintainability strategies, optimise reliability and maximise availability. The traditional approaches are not suitable for performing RAM analysis of satellite navigation systems. Instead, we propose formal models of both a single satellite system and satellite navigation systems and logical specification of reliability, availability and maintainability properties, thus this enable us to analyse such properties with probabilistic model checking approach and its automated tool PRISM.
There are many technical and theoretical challenges that remain to be addressed. In particular, satellite failure often forms part of more complex problems that show through different aspects of the engineering of space based systems. The technical challenges also include basic issues with the representation of safety and space mission critical characteristics of satellite telecommunications due to a group of satellites working together given the limitations of classical modelling approach. An approach to that may be related to other formal techniques. For example, we could specify mobility of connection for satellite constellation with the π-calculus [41, 42] and apply model checking of it [43] with PRISM. In general, until these issues are resolved we remain even less equipped to identify the causes of satellite system failure than we are to support the development of satellite and space based systems.
Actually, numerous failures are distributed differently other than exponential distributions. In particular, a number of failures of satellites have a Weibull distribution [44] , which follows the conventional three-component bathtub curve which models a burn-in and wear-out phase for failure prediction. For future work, we will look at how to represent arbitrary distributions in probabilistic models, and to what extent such kind of distributions are able to be supported by probabilistic model checking approaches. Tables   R  M T BF M T T 
